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Names Are Not Objects: Object-Bound Confinement for Compromised AI Coding Agents
Coding agents read repositories and web pages that anyone can write, and then act with their user's authority. Prompt-injection defenses make it less likely that the model is steered but do not prevent it, so the system around the model must contain an agent that is already compromised. Many exploit
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