arXiv (All)
open access
Persuasion under the Threat of Verification
This paper studies persuasion when public information is costly and receivers can verify the state before acting. Verification may overturn acceptance after favorable public news, but it may also induce acceptance after unfavorable news. We characterize how these two effects shape the sender's optim
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Strategic Information Transmission through the Media#1277402
- Strategic Information Transmission through the Media#1276481
- Dynamic Democratic Consent: A System Dynamics Framework for Public Trust, Political Communication, and Policy Feedback#631976
- The Duty to Promote Digital Minimalism in Group Agents#722813
- The Illusion of Authenticity in Social Media Influencer Culture#181082
Record · ID 1326135
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive