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DelegateGuard: Purpose-Bound Capabilities for Delegated LLM Agent Workflows
\textbf{(Context)} LLM agents increasingly delegate subtasks while holding authority over sensitive data, creating confused-deputy risks: an injected delegate can exfiltrate data, amplify its authority, or act after revocation. Existing leakage benchmarks expose these failures but do not constrain t
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