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MIND: Lightweight and Effective Memory Injection Defense for LLM Agents via Intent-Aware Information Bottleneck
Memory-augmented LLM-based agents are vulnerable to memory injection attacks: Agents may retrieve poisoned memory from attackers, which diverts their behavior from initial user intent and finally causes task failure. However, existing defense mechanisms either incur high computational cost or suffer
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