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Separating Prompt Harmfulness from Interaction Safety via Partial Generation
LLM-based information systems need safety guardrails. Most guardrails classify the prompt alone. If the prompt looks harmful, the system rejects it before any answer is generated. This is costly. Many rejected prompts would have received a safe response. Users lose help they should have received fro
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