arXiv (All)
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When Platforms Pay Users to Correct Misinformation: Revenue Incentives and Governance Capacity in Weibo Annotations
Crowdsourced misinformation governance systems such as Community Notes and Weibo Annotations depend on sustained corrective labor. How monetary incentives shape participation and subsequent governance outcomes remains poorly understood. We conduct a mixed-methods study of Weibo Annotations, analyzin
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