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Building a Sovereign Benchmark The Limits of Private Coordination
Public debt supplies liquidity and collateral services only if institutions coordinate on using the same claim. We study this coordination when use carries a recurring cost and a benefit that rises with other users. Above a quality threshold, two positive-adoption equilibria exist, and under best re
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