arXiv (All)
open access
The Delegation Dilemma: Economies of Scale, Accountability, and Polycentric Governance
Many collective-action systems are neither fully decentralized nor fully centralized: agents voluntarily organize into institutions that share organizational costs and delegate decisions to representatives. Delegation can reduce individual costs, but it also transfers control to representatives whos
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Collective Agents as Moral Actors#104852
- Agency and Normative Self-Governance#767890
- Collectives' Duties and Collectivization Duties#711550
- When Agentic Trust Crosses Organizational Boundaries: Structural Externalization and a Reference Model for Trust Evidence#1048357
- Group Agents, Moral Competence, and Duty-bearers: The Update Argument#90295
Record · ID 1357401
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive