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Distortion of multi-winner elections on the line metric: The polar comparison rule
We study the problem of minimizing metric distortion in multi-winner elections, where a committee of size k is selected from a set of candidates based on voters’ ordinal preferences. We assume that voters and candidates are embedded on a line metric, and social cost is determined by the underlying m
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