Trade, Competitiveness and Growth in the Countries of the South | Zenodo Skip to main Communities My dashboard Log in Sign up Published April 23, 2026 | Version v1 Journal article Open Trade, Competitiveness and Growth in the Countries of the South Authors/Creators Dr Didier François Diégane DIOP 1 Show affiliations 1.
Public Law Department, Cheikh Anta DIOP University, SENEGAL Description The detailed examination of such a subject will be done on the basis of a fundamental problem, which will thus serve as a guideline in the presentation of the ideas that should underlie the approach. In this case, it concerns the question of the links between competitiveness through trade and the growth of countries in the South. In other words, how can GATT and WTO competitiveness of countries in the South, in order to promote their growth? Thus the problem of the method is at the heart of any scientific work as it is true that the method illuminates the hypotheses and determines the conclusions, our approach will be ordered with a few exceptions around the use of the analytical and exegetical method but also comparative. It is understood as the analysis, interpretation and explanation of the rules of law, particularly those contained in the various legal texts of the GATT and the WTO. As for the expected results, it will be a question of studying the incompatibility of tariff preferences with the WTO principle of reciprocity. This one was first brought about through a revision initiated through Part 4 of the GATT. It resulted in a confirmation of the principle of Special and Differential Treatment aimed at compensating for the significant gap in the standard of living of developing countries, and an exception to the principle of reciprocity. The abandonment of strict reciprocity is the lever that activated the principle of granting preferences to developing countries. Thus, non-reciprocity is the principle that governs negotiations with developing countries. Many developing GATT contracting parties criticizethe general role played by the concept of reciprocity in trade negotiations. For them, reciprocity can only be played between countries of a comparable level of development. The fact that developed (or rich) countries demand reciprocity in trade concessions from developing (or poor) countries would be particularly unfair to the latter and would penalise them. Their situation of poverty would mathematically increase the relative weight of their commitments. The contradiction would subsequently be confirmed by the 1979 enabling clause who grants a legal and permanent basis for the derogation status of developing countries and formally confirms the principle of non-reciprocity. Seem, this principle of non-reciprocity is not without its perverse effects. By not being required to offer or be asked for any trade concessions, developing countries are hardly in a position to influence the progress of the negotiations and to have their interests taken into consideration. In reality, the abandonment of the principle of reciprocity in North/South trade relations has profoundly contributed to making the Multilateral Trade Negotiations a matter for developed countries to ensure the promotion and defense of their economic interests. This is an opportunity to ask whether the official recognition of the principle of non-reciprocity has not been counterproductive for Third World countries. In summary, empirical studies suggest that non-reciprocal regimes, such as unilateral tariff preferences, can benefit developing countries in the short term, especially for certain key products (agri-food in particular). However, they do not constitute a sustainable development strategy due to structural limitations, the lack of domestic competitive pressure, and the prevalence of non-tariff barriers. To maximize economic and social benefits, it is essential to strengthen institutional and trade capacities, diversify the economy beyond preferential products, and aim for reciprocal agreements that promote a sustainable framework and motivate structural reform.Thus, we will examine here a contradiction between the principle of non-reciprocity of the GSP and the principle of reciprocity of the WTO initiated by a revision through Part 4 of the GATT (Section I) and a contradiction between the principle of non-reciprocity of the GSP and the principle of reciprocity of the WTO confirmed by the Enabling Clause of 1979 (Section II). Files 18.pdf Files (198.2 kB) Name Size Download all 18.pdf md5:e393d2a8cbfb11688223f9655c2d3be0 198.2 kB Preview Download 84 Views 60 Downloads Show more details All versions This version Views Total views 84 84 Downloads Total downloads 60 60 Data volume Total data volume 13.1 MB 13.1 MB More info on how stats are collected.... Versions External resources Indexed in OpenAIRE Communities Keywords and subjects Keywords Differential treatment, Enabling Clause, GATT, GSP, Non-reciprocity, WTO. Details DOI DOI Badge DOI 10.5281/zenodo.19708171 Markdown [](https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19708171) reStructuredText .. image:: https://zenodo.org/badge/DOI/10.5281/zenodo.19708171.svg :target: https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19708171 HTML <a href="https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19708171"><img src="https://zenodo.org/badge/DOI/10.5281/zenodo.19708171.svg" alt="DOI"></a> Image URL https://zenodo.org/badge/DOI/10.5281/zenodo.19708171.svg Target URL https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.19708171 Resource type Journal article Publisher Innovative Research Journal of Sociology and Humanities Published in Innovative Research Journal of Sociology and Humanities, 03(04), 353 - 363, ISSN: 3050-6875, 2026. Languages Old English (ca. 450-1100) Rights License Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International The Creative Commons Attribution license allows re-distribution and re-use of a licensed work on the condition that the creator is appropriately credited. Read more Citation Export Technical metadata Created April 23, 2026 Modified April 23, 2026 Jump up About About Policies Infrastructure Principles Projects Roadmap Contact Blog Blog Support Help FAQ Developers REST API OAI-PMH Contribute GitHub Donate Funded by Powered by CERN Data Centre & InvenioRDM Status Privacy policy Cookie policy Terms of Use This site uses cookies. Find out more on how we use cookies Accept all cookies Accept only essential cookies