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Generalizing Liquid Democracy to multi-agent delegation: A Voting Weight Measure and Equilibrium Analysis
In this study, we propose a generalization of the classic model of liquid democracy that allows fractional delegation of voting weight, while simultaneously allowing for the existence of equilibrium states. Our approach empowers agents to partition and delegate their votes to multiple representative
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