arXiv (All)
open access
Can SOLARBURST go silicon? A systematic analysis on software supply chain attacks for VLSI design flows
An attacker targeting the software supply chain (SWSC) of VLSI tools can fully subvert the VLSI design pipeline through purely software level compromises. However, cur- rent literature on both SWSC and VLSI hardware security has not explored how software can be used to subvert the security of the VL
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Can SOLARBURST go silicon? A systematic analysis on software supply chain attacks for VLSI design flows#1374977
- FuseChain: Runtime Evidence Reconstruction for Software Supply-Chain Attacks#280129
- Extension of the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Profile for Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) to Transport Layer Security (TLS)#502733
- CVE-2026-105570 — MEDIUM 6.7#1267630
- MCP Pitfall Lab: Exposing Developer Pitfalls in MCP Tool Server Security under Multi-Vector Attacks#128214
Record · ID 1386554
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive