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Bystander on the Fence: Sanctions in a Multipolar World
We provide a theory of optimal trade sanctions with three strategic players: Home (sanctioner), Foreign (target), and Bystander. Bystander may act unilaterally or ally with either party subject to a participation constraint. We derive three novel results. First, members of a coalition generically se
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