arXiv (All)
open access
The Window Is in the Reasoning: When LLM Agents Decide to Follow Prompt Injections
LLM agents that read untrusted content can be hijacked by prompt injections. Runtime monitors that try to catch a hijack before the agent acts, and benchmarks that score each task with a single run, share an assumption: whether an agent follows an injection is settled when the injection is read. We
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- From Attack Success to Attack Severity: Counterfactual Memory Attacks on LLM Agents#1119205
- Reflections on Trusting Trust, Revisited: Contaminating Self-Modifying AI Coding Agents with Poisoned Benchmarks#1011532
- Reflections on Trusting Trust, Revisited: Contaminating Self-Modifying AI Coding Agents with Poisoned Benchmarks#965362
- When can we trust untrusted monitoring? A safety case sketch across collusion strategies#1049757
- Pinned and Still Unstable: Within-Judge Verdict Variance and the Noise Floor of LLM-as-Judge Leaderboards#1117756
Record · ID 1388614
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive