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Robustness over efficiency in climate coalitions: a bistable model and a map of architectures
Designs for international climate cooperation face a trade-off between efficiency and robustness to institutional erosion. We formalize it in a stylized coalition-formation game with two enrolment channels, a membership premium read as the value of club goods and an outsider drain, stabilized with r
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