A House Monotone, Coherent, and Droop Proportional Ranked Candidate Voting Method

[2506.12318] A House Monotone, Coherent, and Droop Proportional Ranked Candidate Voting Method Skip to main content Search Submit Donate Log in Search arXiv Press Enter to search · Advanced search Economics > Theoretical Economics arXiv:2506.12318 (econ) [Submitted on 14 Jun 2025 ( v1 ), last revised 11 Apr 2026 (this version, v3)] Title: A House Monotone, Coherent, and Droop Proportional Ranked Candidate Voting Method Authors: Ross Hyman View a PDF of the paper titled A House Monotone, Coherent, and Droop Proportional Ranked Candidate Voting Method, by Ross Hyman View PDF Abstract: A Ranked candidate voting method based on Phragmen's procedure is described that can be used to produce a top-down proportional candidate list. The method complies with the Droop proportionality criterion satisfied by Single Transferable Vote. It also complies with house monotonicity and coherence, which are the ranked-candidate analogs of the divisor methods properties of always avoiding the Alabama and New State paradoxes. The highest ranked candidate in the list is the Instant Runoff winner, which is in at least one Droop proportional set of N winners for all N. Comments: Procedure corrected to correspond to the proof Subjects: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH) Cite as: arXiv:2506.12318 [econ.TH] (or arXiv:2506.12318v3 [econ.TH] for this version) https://doi.org/10.48550/arXiv.2506.12318 Focus to learn more arXiv-issued DOI via DataCite Submission history From: Ross Hyman [ view email ] [v1] Sat, 14 Jun 2025 02:45:01 UTC (208 KB) [v2] Fri, 20 Jun 2025 13:30:05 UTC (214 KB) [v3] Sat, 11 Apr 2026 15:46:05 UTC (237 KB) Full-text links: Access Paper: View a PDF of the paper titled A House Monotone, Coherent, and Droop Proportional Ranked Candidate Voting Method, by Ross Hyman View PDF view license Current browse context: econ.TH < prev | next > new | recent | 2025-06 Change to browse by: econ References & Citations NASA ADS Google Scholar Semantic Scholar export BibTeX citation Loading... BibTeX formatted citation × loading... Data provided by: Bookmark Bibliographic Tools Bibliographic and Citation Tools Bibliographic Explorer Toggle Bibliographic Explorer ( What is the Explorer? ) Connected Papers Toggle Connected Papers ( What is Connected Papers? ) Litmaps Toggle Litmaps ( What is Litmaps? ) scite.ai Toggle scite Smart Citations ( What are Smart Citations? ) Code, Data, Media Code, Data and Media Associated with this Article alphaXiv Toggle alphaXiv ( What is alphaXiv? ) Links to Code Toggle CatalyzeX Code Finder for Papers ( What is CatalyzeX? ) DagsHub Toggle DagsHub ( What is DagsHub? ) GotitPub Toggle Gotit.pub ( What is GotitPub? ) Huggingface Toggle Hugging Face ( What is Huggingface? ) ScienceCast Toggle ScienceCast ( What is ScienceCast? ) Demos Demos Replicate Toggle Replicate ( What is Replicate? ) Spaces Toggle Hugging Face Spaces ( What is Spaces? ) Spaces Toggle TXYZ.AI ( What is TXYZ.AI? ) Related Papers Recommenders and Search Tools Link to Influence Flower Influence Flower ( What are Influence Flowers? ) Core recommender toggle CORE Recommender ( What is CORE? ) Author Venue Institution Topic About arXivLabs arXivLabs: experimental projects with community collaborators arXivLabs is a framework that allows collaborators to develop and share new arXiv features directly on our website. Both individuals and organizations that work with arXivLabs have embraced and accepted our values of openness, community, excellence, and user data privacy. arXiv is committed to these values and only works with partners that adhere to them. Have an idea for a project that will add value for arXiv's community? Learn more about arXivLabs . Which authors of this paper are endorsers? | Disable MathJax ( What is MathJax? ) We gratefully acknowledge support from our major funders , member institutions , , and all contributors. About · Help · Contact · Subscribe · Copyright · Privacy · Accessibility · Operational Status (opens in new tab) Major funding support from

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