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DECKER: Domain-invariant Embedding for Cross-Keyboard Extraction and Recognition
Acoustic side-channel attacks (ASCA) on keyboards pose a significant security risk, as keystrokes can be inferred from typing acoustics, revealing sensitive information. Prior ASCA studies are limited by small-scale datasets with restricted diversity in users, keyboards, and environments, constraini
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