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Active Inference via Incentive Design: Eliciting Divergent Behaviors under Partial Observability
We introduce Active Inference through Incentive Design, a framework in which a leader offers strategic incentive to elicit diverging behaviors from followers of different types, thereby improving intent inference under imperfect observations. We analyze two settings: Case 1: a perfectly observable l
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