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Diversity, Efficiency, and Incentives in Political Prediction Markets
Critics of political prediction markets argue that prices are biased because traders are not representative of voters. We test this claim by analyzing data from political betting markets spanning more than 100 years. Our analysis yields two main findings: (1) Acros markets, traders were not represen
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