HAL (France)
open access
Collateral and reputation in a model of strategic defaults
This paper builds a finite-horizon model to study the role of physical collateral in a model of strategic defaults, when the borrower can develop reputation for honesty. Asset ownership increases attractiveness of the reputational channel: the borrower who would prefer to remain in autarky in the ab
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