HAL (France)
open access
The welfare effects of policy signalling in a regime change game
We explore a specific parametric example of a regime change game in which a policymaker defends the status quo against a continuum of atomistic agents who seek to overthrow it. At the start of the game, the policymaker can initiate a policy intervention to make an attack less appealing. When agents’
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Global Social Policy Digest 21.2: Turning the tide in the battle against COVID-19?#1160895
- Why2Speak: Faithful Reasoning for Abstaining Action Policies#659231
- Why2Speak: Faithful Reasoning for Abstaining Action Policies#657095
- Policy Externalism#721267
- The Everyday Practice of Policy#460450
Record · ID 1500797
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive