Council Decision (EU) 2026/2472 of 21 October 2026 on the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union in the written procedure by the Participants to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits concerning a Common Line derogating from the rules on minimum premium rates in relation to an energy project in Egypt
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L_202602472EN.000101.fmx.xml Official Journal of the European Union EN L series 2026/2472 30.10.2026 COUNCIL DECISION (EU) 2026/2472 of 21 October 2026 on the position to be taken on behalf of the European Union in the written procedure by the Participants to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits concerning a Common Line derogating from the rules on minimum premium rates in relation to an energy project in Egypt THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, and in particular Article 207(4), first subparagraph, in conjunction with Article 218(9), thereof, Having regard to the proposal from the European Commission, Whereas: (1) The guidelines set out in the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits (the ‘Arrangement’), developed within the framework of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), have been transposed and therefore been made legally binding in the Union by means of Regulation (EU) No 1233/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council ( 1 ) . (2) In accordance with Chapter IV, Section 5 of the Arrangement, a Common Line was proposed (the ‘Common Line’), derogating from the rules on minimum premium rates laid down in the Arrangement in relation to the ‘Energy Valley’ project in Egypt (the ‘project’). (3) The Common Line was proposed due to changes in conditions that have occurred in the course of the implementation of the project, which have resulted in unexpected increases in project costs and would make the project unviable without competitive support from an export credit agency. (4) The Participants to the Arrangement (the ‘Participants’) are to decide, in a written procedure, on the proposal for the Common Line. (5) The Common Line will, if agreed, produce legal effects for the Union and is capable of decisively influencing the content of Union rules. (6) It is therefore appropriate to establish the position to be taken on the Union’s behalf concerning the proposed Common Line. (7) In order to ensure that the project is not jeopardised, the position of the Union should therefore be to exceptionally accept the proposed Common Line, provided that the more advantageous minimum premium rate allowed under the Common Line is applied only to exports from the Participants and to local costs, HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION: Article 1 The position to be taken on the Union’s behalf in the written procedure by the Participants (the ‘Participants’) to the Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits (the ‘Arrangement’) concerning a proposed Common Line (the ‘Common Line’) derogating from the rules on minimum premium rates laid down in the Arrangement in relation to the ‘Energy Valley’ project in Egypt (the ‘project’) shall be to exceptionally accept the Common Line, provided that the more advantageous minimum premium rate allowed under the Common Line is applied only to exports from the Participants and to local costs. In view of the fact that it is a fundamental principle of the Arrangement that premium rates charged by the Participants are to be risk-based, acceptance of the Common Line shall be given exceptionally to ensure that the project is not jeopardised and shall not create a precedent. The Union notes that any exceptional derogation from the rules on minimum premium rates laid down in the Arrangement shall be designed to ensure that the Participants take the necessary mitigating measures to address any issues linked to economic security, cybersecurity, diversification or supply-chain dependency. Article 2 This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption. Done at Brussels, 21 October 2026. For the Council The President T. BYRNE ( 1 ) Regulation (EU) No 1233/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 November 2011 on the application of certain guidelines in the field of officially supported export credits and repealing Council Decisions 2001/76/EC and 2001/77/EC ( OJ L 326, 8.12.2011, p. 45 , ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2011/1233/oj ). ELI: http://data.europa.eu/eli/dec/2026/2472/oj ISSN 1977-0677 (electronic edition)
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