Camus' Early Logic of the Absurd

Camus’ early “logic of the absurd” has been interpreted and assessed differently. In this article I do two things: First, I outline what I take to be the most adequate interpretation. Second, I discuss three challenges defenders of the “logic of the absurd” may be said to face (given that my interpretation in the first part is correct). My approach is rather unorthodox. Although Camus explicitly refused to be seen as a philosopher, and although if one sees him as a philosopher, he certainly has to be seen as belonging to the tradition of continental (as opposed to analytic) philosophy, I look at him from the perspective of analytic philosophy. It appears, first, that Camus conceives of the absurd as a relation between man’s search for meaning and the world which is not answering this search for meaning, and that he takes the fact of there being this absurd relation to imply proscriptions of both physical and philosophical suicide and an obligation to revolt. And it appears, second, that beliefs in the existence of the absurd can not be shown false by reference to their causal history (genetic challenge) and that Camus is not violating Hume’s law (is-ought challenge), but that the early philosophy of the absurd is inconsistent (consistency challenge).