Does Science Need Signs? Minimal Operational-Shape Theory, Representation-Free Autonomous Science, and Xenoscience What Operational Shape Remains at the End When Operational Sequences Historically Classified as Science in Human History Are Decomposed?

This paper asks whether science requires signs, representations, or symbolically articulated models in order to remain scientifically operative. Rather than assuming that scientific activity must be organized through human-readable concepts, linguistic propositions, diagrams, equations, or representational structures, the analysis progressively decomposes operational sequences historically classified as science into preparation, discrimination, measurement, retention, comparison, intervention, prediction, error detection, revision, and reconfiguration. The central question is what operational structure remains when representational mediation is minimized or removed. Minimal Operational-Shape Theory identifies the smallest recurrent organization of differences required for a process to continue functioning as inquiry rather than mere physical transition. Representation-free autonomous science is treated as a limiting case in which an artificial or machine scientific system can generate, test, revise, and act on operational distinctions without requiring those distinctions to be encoded in forms interpretable by human observers. The paper distinguishes the absence of human-readable signs from the absence of internal differentiation, constraint, memory, or inferential organization. Xenoscience extends this analysis by asking whether scientific operations can persist when variables, state spaces, observational relations, and symbolic interfaces are themselves revisable. The broader claim is that science may not require signs in the human or semantic sense, but it does require preserved and revisable differences that can constrain prediction, intervention, comparison, and subsequent reconfiguration.