Concerning Linguistic Reference and the “Split–Brain” Experiments

Many works in the philosophy of language have produced varying claims to deduce the nature of linguistic signs’ capacity to reference the world. Those in the analytic tradition tend to evaluate linguistic reference via logical structures, while those in the continental tend to engage with first–person phenomenal experience. Findings from neuroscientist Roger Sperry’s ‘split–brain’ experiments provide a challenge to both philosophical perspectives. Sperry’s experiments demonstrate that, though consciously unable to recognize linguistic signs or understand themselves to be having a first–person perceptual experience, split–brain patients could determine referents of linguistic signs. Consequently, reference appears possible while conscious understanding of logical structures and phenomenal experience is inaccessible. This paper aims to show that analytic and continental viewpoints are threatened by the phenomenon of split–brain patient comprehension. A potential objection, concerned with unconscious comprehension via engrams, is then evaluated. However, by committing to unconscious comprehension, this paper demonstrates that philosophers of both traditions would weaken their perspectives’ essential commitments. To conclude, the paper argues that the findings of Roger Sperry produce an interesting fissure in popular theories of reference, and asks readers to determine which conditions are necessary for reference.