The relationship between Madhyamaka Buddhist metaphysics and ethics

On the dominant interpretation of the Madhyamaka ('Middle Way’) school of Buddhist philosophy, there are no mind-independent facts about reality. This metaphysical stance commits Madhyamaka to some form of metaethical antirealism. However, Madhyamaka also espouses a universal first-order ethics of radical altruism. How do the metaphysics and ethics of Madhyamaka fit together? Can one defend a universal—and counterintuitive—first-order ethics against the backdrop of a globally antirealist metaphysics? And even if one can, does the metaphysics of Madhyamaka support the ethics—as prominent Buddhist philosophers and exegetes maintain? I argue that Madhyamaka can reconcile its metaphysical and ethical pictures by appealing to an ideal reflection account of moral truth. However, the metaphysics of Madhyamaka does not support the ethics. If we assume the metaphysics but fail to adopt the ethics, we make no mistake. The ethics is compatible with, but does not follow from, the metaphysics.