Contributing enough: Integrity and social positions

This chapter offers an integrity-based account of why we should contribute enough over time, addressing the inefficacy problem that arises in the context of individual donations to large-scale aid efforts, where an agent’s potential to make a difference is often uncertain. Contrary to views that emphasize the identifiability of beneficiaries, the chapter underlines the agent’s social position as being distinctly situated to help. Building on the concept of integrity, it provides a non-instrumental rationale for contributing despite uncertainty: integrity requires a coherent alignment of values and actions over time, as well as responsiveness to collective reasons and context. The alignment view of integrity put forward distinguishes cases involving clear collective strategies from those lacking coordination. It rejects strong superfluity claims, framing donations as pattern-level contributions that preserve moral coherence while respecting feasibility and personal projects. Integrity holds that we should not discount the effects we bring about together.