Phenomenal Force: Lessons from Olfaction

Phenomenal force is often said to be type-individuating of perceptual experience. Two counterexamples to this claim have been developed in the literature, one based on the perceptual experiences of subjects in C. W. Perky’s experiments on mental imagery and another based on the perceptual experiences of psychiatric patients with derealisation conditions. I first argue that both are ineffective and then explore the prospects for a different counterexample: pungent olfactory experiences that are purely feature-placing. I conclude that such experiences are effective counterexamples to a prominent construal of phenomenal force as the presentation of object-property compounds. Although other conceptions of phenomenal force escape the objection, the counterexample remains relevant, both for such views in particular and for our understanding of phenomenal force more generally—pungent olfactory experiences illustrate the importance of distinguishing between phenomenal force with respect to properties and phenomenal force with respect to objects.