A Neglected Route to Barcan Objects

This paper explores a reason to endorse the Barcan Formula that is different from many of the usual ones offered, and which sees the transition associated with the Barcan Formula as part of a wider phenomenon. Once we mention the possibility of objects that apparently do not actually exist, but which could have, we can go on to talk about those objects, and dispute about them, describe them further, and so on. We can also do this when we talk about what there was, when we explore a hypothesis about what there is, or what people believe there is, or fictional stories about what objects there are. In each case, in ordinary English (and other natural languages) we can legitimately continue talking as if the relevant possible objects, hypothetical objects, believed-in objects and so on do exist. For those of us who share this disposition, it becomes hard to resist the kinds of transitions that appear to vindicate the Barcan Formula and generalisations of it. After making this case, the paper discusses ways we might, nevertheless, try to resist expanding our apparent ontology in this way.