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What Standard Evaluations Hide About Detectors of Hijacked LLM Agents: Rare Attacks, Unseen Tools and Benchmark Transfer
Detectors can flag hijacked large language model (LLM) agents from the traces of the tools they call. In the eleven evaluations we audited, attacks or anomalies make up 16% to 86% of the test samples, no evaluation varies that share, and six report no test on data from a second benchmark or source.
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