Conceptualism about Socially Constructed Properties

This dissertation argues for an antirealism about socially constructed properties by arguing that it has a more plausible way of addressing the issues of a complete theory of social construction than its realist counterpart. The first chapter lays the groundwork for the dissertation. In this chapter, I lay down the definitions of socially constructed properties, realism, and antirealism about them. Socially constructed properties are those that depend on the collective acceptance or behavior of a society. Realism about socially constructed properties holds that these properties are universals or tropes instantiated in the world. Antirealism, by contrast, denies that such properties are instantiated in the world. The second chapter lists and explains the issues that a complete theory of social construction must address. The issues are: (a) SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION; (b) CONTINGENCY; (c) SOCIAL TRUTH; (d) OBJECTIVITY; (e) CAUSAL POWER; (f) INCONSISTENCY; (g) ETHICS. The third chapter delineates how realism might address these issues. While realism might have straightforward account of most of the issues, I argue that realism fails to address INCONSISTENCY and CAUSAL POWER satisfyingly. If realism is right, then social construction yields genuine properties even when it results in inconsistent properties. However, the world cannot accommodate inconsistent properties. Thus, realism is false. Second, many have claimed that socially constructed properties such as race, gender, and being the president have causal powers. However, I argue that this claim is problematic. The fourth and the final chapter argues that antirealism—of the conceptualist variety—fares better in accounting for these issues. Conceptualism is the view that there are no socially constructed properties, only socially constructed concepts whose application conditions are determined by collective acceptance or behavior of a society. This view readily avoids the issues above: the messiness of the social world does not make the world countenance worldly inconsistencies and socially constructed properties have no causal powers since they do not exist. Moreover, conceptualism is consistent, if not conducive, to the project of resisting oppression based on socially constructed properties.