Refutation of “The Impossibility of an Actually Infinite Future” (Wakil Ahmad Hakimi)

This paper presents a critical refutation of The Impossibility of an Actually Infinite Future by Wakil Ahmad Hakimi. The central thesis of the original work—that an infinite future is metaphysically incoherent due to grounding, locatability, and traversal constraints—is shown to rest on a series of unjustified assumptions, equivocations, and structural missteps. In particular, the argument fails by (1) illicitly importing the traversal principle into a domain where it has no force, (2) conflating epistemic access with ontological determination, (3) redefining “locatability” in a way that prejudges the conclusion, and (4) generating a false dilemma between finitude and contradiction. The conclusion that time must form a finite block universe does not follow. The argument collapses under its own internal constraints.