The Logic of Ineffability

This paper analyzes the concept of ineffability and outlines a theory of the logic and semantics of ineffability claims. I begin by identifying three core problems for any theory of ineffability: (a) the problem of consistency: how is it possible to say that some entity x is ineffable without contradicting oneself? (b) The problem of reference: how is it possible to refer to some ineffable identity x if reference presupposes the ability to identify and thus to describe the entity in question? (c) The problem of meaning: what is the meaning of negative statements about an ineffable entity x if x being ineffable means that nothing can be said about x? I then present and discuss three possible solutions to these problems that have been advanced in the recent literature: the theory of illuminating falsehoods (Lebens 2014), the theory of non-fundamental truths (Jacobs 2015), and the theory of apo-minimalism (van Elswyk forthcoming). I reject all three and instead develop an epistemic capacities-based account of ineffability that relativizes it to types of epistemic systems and their linguistic capabilities.