Debunking under uncertainty: a probabilistic criterion and the case of edenic color realism

Debunking arguments aim to show that a subject’s justification for a belief is undercut by their learning that the belief, or the justification supporting it, is not appropriately connected—explanatorily, modally, or otherwise—to the truth of its content. A common reply to such arguments is that a subject can be shielded from losing their justification if they hold relevant “Linking Views”, views on which the targeted belief is connected to the truth of its content, often via supervenience theses or other metaphysical views. It seems, then, that the would-be debunker must rebut the relevant Linking Views before being able to run their debunking argument. Drawing on a probabilistic account of debunking developed elsewhere, and using edenic color realism as a case study, we show how this obstacle can be avoided, allowing us to debunk without rebutting.