Postivist Misconceptions: An Obstacle to Understanding Pluralism

This paper examines the influence of positivist conceptions of scientific knowledge on contemporary economic methodology. While such views have been extensively critiqued within the philosophy of science, they continue to shape standard economic reasoning, often in simplified or implicit forms. The paper identifies several core misconceptions associated with positivism—particularly concerning the role of unobservables, causality, and the relationship between theory and evidence—and argues that these hinder the development of an adequate understanding of economic phenomena. Drawing on well-known themes such as the underdetermination of theory by evidence and the theory-ladenness of observation, the paper shows that empirical data alone cannot uniquely determine theoretical conclusions. These considerations have important implications for economics, where the search for universal, context-independent laws has often led to neglect of historical, social, and institutional specificity. The paper argues that recognizing the limits of positivist methodology supports a pluralist approach, in which economic theories are understood as historically situated and context-dependent.