What It Is Like to Think: Consciousness and Intentionality

This paper examines the relationship between consciousness and intentionality in contemporary philosophy of mind, focusing on David Chalmers’ formulation of the hard problem of consciousness. Consciousness is understood as subjective phenomenal experience, or what it is like to be in a mental state. At the same time, intentionality refers to the mind’s capacity to represent or be directed toward objects, thoughts, and states of affairs. The study traces the concept of intentionality from Franz Brentano’s notion of intentional inexistence to later developments in analytic philosophy, including the theories of meaning, reference, and naming by Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Saul Kripke, who sought to explain how thoughts relate to language and reality. It also considers internalist and externalist approaches to mental content through thinkers such as Jerry Fodor and Hilary Putnam. The paper then evaluates competing views on whether consciousness depends upon intentionality or whether intentionality is grounded in phenomenal consciousness. Particular attention is given to Chalmers’ claim that subjective experience cannot be reduced to physical or representational processes alone. It argues that understanding consciousness requires sustained engagement with intentionality, since representation, meaning, and phenomenal awareness remain deeply interconnected philosophical problems.