Ontological Exhaustion and the Paradox of Epicurus: A Phenomenological and Ontological Analysis of Frame-Dependence

This paper examines the Epicurean paradox by investigating its dependence on underlying ontological assumptions, particularly the finitude of consciousness and a strictly materialist framework. It introduces the concept of “ontological exhaustion” to describe the recurring inadequacy of human strategies for meaning-seeking when confined to such assumptions. Drawing on contemporary debates in philosophy of mind, especially the limits of reductive materialism and the so-called hard problem of consciousness, the paper develops a processual hypothesis in which consciousness is treated as a structural dimension of reality rather than an emergent byproduct. Within this framework, suffering is reinterpreted not as a necessary contradiction in the existence of a benevolent order, but as a phenomenon whose philosophical force depends on the ontological framing of experience. The paper does not aim to establish a definitive metaphysical conclusion, but to clarify how different ontological commitments alter the structure and perceived force of the problem of evil.