PhilArchive
open access
How doubt spreads in a rational mind
To be in a state of doubt with respect to a question is to be on the fence or divided as to which of its answers is true. What are the rational requirements for the state of being in doubt? In particular, which other questions should one be in doubt about, given the questions one is in doubt about? The paper provides answers to these questions.
Conceptio Open Archive
Analyze & explore related research in Conceptio
Connect this record directly into your research workflow or AI agent. Explore citations across open repositories, query full text, and export structured proof bundles.
This document is indexed with metadata only: full text is not available in the archive for this record. Open the official source ↗
Related documents
- Skeptical doubting and mindful self-reflection#752808
- Skeptical Appeal: The Source‐Content Bias#774085
- Affective Doubt and Antagonistic Politics#91382
- (Un)reasonable doubt as affective experience: obsessive–compulsive disorder, epistemic anxiety and the feeling of uncertainty#775226
- Skepticism about the internal world#704145
Record · ID 170194
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Retrieved via Conceptio: every document is proof-bundled with source, license, and retrieval metadata.
Bring this data into your agent: Connect via MCP or API · 20 free credits to start · no card required
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive
Read the Docs → · View CLI source on GitHub · Conceptio Open Knowledge Archive