The Hard Problem of Consciousness and the Philosophy of Reality

The so-called “hard problem of consciousness” is usually formulated as the question of why physical or functional processes are accompanied by subjective experience. This paper argues that the problem arises from a mistaken separation of the objective and the subjective as two externally related domains. Within the Philosophy of Reality, grounded in the Basic Method of Philosophy, consciousness is not treated as an additional non-physical property of the brain, nor as a reducible physical process. Rather, it is understood as a two-sided reality: on the objective side, as the physical existence of concepts, images, and feelings in the brain; on the subjective side, as their meaningful and experiential essence. Thought is therefore not merely the manipulation of abstract information, but the formation and transformation of physical analogues of objects in the brain. Since every change in a concept is at once a physical change in the brain and a change in the form through which the concept is immediately given to consciousness, thinking is necessarily accompanied by experience. Negative experience corresponds to the weakening or destruction of conceptual structures, while positive experience corresponds to their strengthening, integration, or harmonization. Thus, the hard problem is not solved within its traditional formulation, but dissolved as a consequence of an inadequate ontology of thought and experience.