Non-Arbitrary Ethics and the Münchhausen Trilemma (MetaEthics)

The Münchhausen Trilemma is often taken to show that attempts at ultimate justification terminate in one of three unsatisfactory outcomes: infinite regress, circularity, or a dogmatic foundational stopping point. This paper examines the trilemma in relation to the Ethics of Metaphysical Congruence, a metaethical framework that grounds moral normativity in non optional metaphysical structures. The central claim is that the force of the trilemma against foundationalist ethics depends heavily on whether the proposed foundation is arbitrary. If a foundation is merely stipulated, inherited, or selected by preference, the foundationalist horn remains vulnerable. However, if a foundation cannot be coherently denied without performative inconsistency, it occupies a different justificatory position. The paper argues that Reality and Awareness, understood minimally as that something is the case and that experience occurs, function in this way within the Ethics of Metaphysical Congruence. The aim is not to dissolve the Münchhausen Trilemma as a formal structure, but to show that non arbitrary foundationalism may weaken the deadlock force usually associated with its foundationalist horn.