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Are Uploads Self?
This essay aims to justify two conclusions: 1. Computer emulations of brains, when of sufficient detail and fidelity, are equally conscious as biological brains – they experience the same ‘qualia’. 2. If you ‘Upload’ your brain into a computer so that it can be emulated, the resulting conscious states are yours – they will be experienced by you.
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