Aristotle on the Desire-Cognition Duality of the Inner Mover of Animal Locomotion (in Chinese)

The question of the inner mover of animal locomotion in Aristotle᾽s On the Soul has given rise to interpretative controversy. Some scholars have argued that either desire or practical cognition is the inner mover of animal locomotion, while others have argued that desire and practical cognition together constitute the inner mover of animal locomotion, and still others have argued that desire alone is the inner mover of animal locomotion. This article argues that all three interpretations are incorrect because they all rest on the false presupposition that desiring and practical cognizing are two different activities. Rather, this article defends that desiring and practical cognizing are one and the same activity, and on this basis argues that the inner mover of animal locomotion is one and same activity that is both desiring and practical cognizing, i.e., the inner mover of animal locomotion has desire-cognition duality. This view explains why the same external object is both the object of desire and the object of practical cognition, and why it can cause the animal to move via one unified inner mover that is identical to both desire and practical cognition.