Piacere negativo. Una lettura non antropocentrica del sublime in Kant

In this article, I challenge the anthropocentric reading of the Kantian sublime by examining the meaning of the «negative» aspect involved in this experience. Although the sublime in Kant discloses the rational ground of the human being and his moral «superiority», it also enlightens on the human being as a natural being with sensible limits. By stressing these twofold aspects of the sublime, this paper aims to show that the Kantian sublime cannot be conceived as anthropocentric, for it highlights a peculiar relationship between pleasure and displeasure, that can be meant as a renewed balance between human being and nature, rather than an imposition of the former over the latter. The negative pleasure in the sublime can be considered as the link between a displeasure due to human sensible limits, on the one hand, and a pleasure that refers to his rational capacity, on the other hand. Accordingly, Kant’s account of the sublime supports an environmental rather than anthropocentric reading, as it begins with an acknowledgment of nature and human limitations in relation to it, and then makes the human being aware of his moral ground.