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On the Question of Self-Awareness in a Domestic Cat
This paper asks whether a single domestic cat, observed continuously from kittenhood, exhibits self-awareness, and treats the question deflationarily. Self-awareness is understood not as a binary capacity but as a layered set of sub-capacities, namely sentience, body self-awareness, theory of mind, and reflective self-recognition, which develop and appear somewhat independently. The argument rests entirely on naturally occurring behavior rather than staged experiments, trading experimental control for the depth and rare-event coverage afforded by more than a year of continuous observation. Mapping specific recurrent behaviors onto each layer, I argue that the subject demonstrably possesses sentience and individual social recognition, provides strong evidence of body self-awareness, most compellingly in a spontaneous episode that reproduces the logic of the body-as-obstacle paradigm without instruction, and weaker but real evidence of theory-of-mind precursors. He shows no evidence of reflective self-recognition, but I argue this absence is uninformative rather than negative, since the only standard instrument, the mirror test, presumes visual self-investigation and is poorly suited to a scent- and sound-led animal. The defensible conclusion is a modest one: several recognized building blocks of self-awareness are present and jointly deployed toward real goals, while the highest tier remains open and, with current methods, may be unanswerable.
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