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Particular-Directedness as Structural Consequence - A Derivation from Non-Coercion, Determinacy, and the Dyadic Insufficiency Argument

Pelley, Mark
PhilArchive · Papers
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philosophy
What does it mean for the ground of being to relate to you — not to humanity, not to a type you instantiate, but to you as this unrepeatable individual? Agápēic Relational Metaphysics committed to this claim in its early papers without formally deriving it. This paper closes that gap. The result is not a new primitive but a forced structural consequence: given non-coercive relation and a genuinely determinate other, particular-directedness follows necessarily. The argument is overdetermined across three independent paths. The non-coercion constraint excludes type-tracking, description-tracking, and formal slot-tracking: each reduces the other to something the ground relates to through its own apparatus rather than through the other as this one. The Dyadic Insufficiency Argument provides an independent path: a bond closing on a type-slot rather than on the particular instantiating it satisfies the form of relation without its actuality. The inseparability thesis — thisness is unrepeatable relational contrast-position inseparable from the particular whose position it is — closes the strongest remaining escape route: abstract contrast-position tracking either collapses into particular-directedness or fails non-coercion. The conclusion survives the removal of any single path. The derivation is typed D and operates at Tier 2 of the ARM series. Its downstream consequences are direct: non-fungible worth, horror-defeat, and the not-in-vain condition each rest on the ground's relation being directed at this one whose existence cannot be averaged out, replaced, or abandoned. This paper shows that those consequences rest not on an asserted posit but on the same structural necessity as the first principle itself.
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