Virulent Claims

Our sense of self is distinctively social. It deeply matters to who we take ourselves to be that others recognize the claims we make on them and that we recognize the claims they make on us. Significant work on ideology and oppression characterizes how oppressive ideologies deny this kind of second-personal recognition. Yet, not enough attention has been given to the disturbing possibility that, even when successful, the personhood-constituting role of second-personal recognition can serve oppressive ideologies. Here I characterize such a mechanism. Some second-personal claims, I argue, are virulent. Their recognition coopts their target’s agency, as their success presupposes her own endorsement of her subordinated position with respect to the agent who issues these claims. At the same time, however, failure to recognize these claims deeply hurts the issuing agent, as their failure amounts to denying and rejecting a social standing that he deeply values. Crucially, this double binding profile of virulent claims illuminates a distinctive way in which ideology preserves itself—not only by shaping what we believe or what we do, but also by shaping who we are.