A Pragmatist Solution to the Paradox of Fiction

People can experience emotions towards fictional characters who we know do not exist in the real world. To make sense of this phenomenon, philosophers have proposed various strategies to show that belief is not necessary for feeling genuine and rational emotions. In this paper, I offer a new perspective and argue that we can understand the relevant beliefs in a pragmatist way. According to this view, when engaging with fictions, we pragmatically believe in the existence of fictional objects. The reason for this pragmatist belief is a practical consideration: to enjoy the aesthetic value of the fictional work. This pragmatist belief is more committing and direct than hypothetical attitudes such as pretense, make-believe, supposition, or imagination. It is also more immediate and less deliberative than acceptance. Finally, it recognizes the close connection between emotions towards fictions and emotions in real life, thereby can accommodate both the emotional carry-over effect and the special functions of emotions directed at fictional objects.