The Hierarchy Behind the Problem of Self-Reference

The self-reference paradox is a classic problem in logic and philosophy. Traditional approaches—Russell’s theory of types, Tarski’s distinction between object language and metalanguage, Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, and deconstruction—address the issue only after it arises, without explaining why self-reference leads to paradox in the first place. This paper argues that the root of the paradox lies in hierarchical dislocation: higher levels dominate lower levels, and lower levels cannot use logic to address higher-level problems. Bringing propositions from different levels onto the same plane breaks conceptual boundaries and generates self-reference. By introducing the hierarchical perspective, this paper offers a new framework for reinterpreting key issues in the history of philosophy—such as Kant’s antinomies and Gödel’s theorems—and opens new possibilities for understanding the boundaries and structure of reason itself.