The Architecture of Orphaned States: Capgras Delusion as a Structural Breakdown of Modular Perceptual Ownership

Most contemporary neuropsychiatric accounts of Capgras delusion rely on two-factor cognitive models, according to which the delusional belief is an ad hoc explanatory hypothesis generated in response to an anomalous experience, such as diminished familiarity, loss of affective response, or violated expectation. More recently, Bayesian predictive-processing frameworks have modeled these anomalies in terms of altered precision weighting and hierarchical inference. This paper proposes a more parsimonious one-factor experiential account. We argue that diminished familiarity and violated expectation are not the primary abnormalities underlying Capgras, but rather downstream consequences of a more fundamental disruption in ownership over perceptual content. Specifically, we propose that perceptual representations are successfully generated but fail to acquire the localized ownership signature that normally binds them to the self. Rather than reflecting an inferential miscalculation, Capgras arises from a localized failure within the cognitive architecture responsible for representing perceptual states as one's own. By treating "mineness" as a modular property of distinct cognitive subsystems, rather than a unitary global capacity, the proposed model addresses the longstanding specificity problem facing one-factor theories without invoking additional explanatory factors. On this account, the Capgras delusion represents the rational narrative interpretation of an otherwise intact perceptual state that is experienced without ownership.