An Approach to Hermann Cohen’s Anti-Psychological Interpretation of Kant’s Synthetic a priori

The most important issue in Immanuel Kant’s epistemological system is Synthetic a priori judgments. Some interpreters of Kant have criticized his philosophical system by presenting a psychological interpretation of Kant. Hermann Cohen, a German philosopher, is one of the interpreters of Kant’s epistemological system who, unlike this group, has strictly avoided Kant’s psychological interpretation and has criticized such interpretations by presenting a new and original interpretation of a priori authorship propositions. In his interpretation of Kant, he states three levels or degrees for a priori authorship propositions and refers the third degree to common experience. For this purpose, he starts from “place” and, by reflecting on the meaning of place, reaches three levels or degrees of a priority: 1) place as something that precedes every other sensory thing; 2) place as form; 3) place as a formal condition of the possibility of experience. By using the third-level a priori, Kuhn acquits Kant of the accusations of subjectivism. Kuhn considers the reference for third-order a priori propositions to be the principles of mathematics and the fundamental laws of pure natural science, namely mechanics. He believes that these principles and laws constitute the possibility of experience. This experience, unlike personal experiences, is general and common to all individuals. In his view, the task of philosophy is to arrive at third-order a priori principles by reflecting on this mathematical natural science. Such a science varies in every era and, as a result, the a priori propositions will also be different in every era.